

## Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USINT CAIRO

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 239135

FOL TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO TUNIS TRIPOLI AMMAN JIDDA  
BEIRUT TEL AVIV KHARTOUM THE HAGUE ALGIERS USCINCEUR DEC 05  
FM RABAT REPEATED FOR YOUR ACTION

QTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 5259

DEPT PASS CAIRO

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR XF

SUBJ: ALGIERS SUMMIT

1. SUMMARY: COMMENTING ON RECENT ALGIERS SUMMIT  
CONFERENCE, FOREIGN MINISTER BENHIMA EMPHASIZES IMPOR-  
TANCE TO ARABS OF ISRAELI PERFORMANCE ON CEASEFIRE  
AGREEMENT. REPORTS FAISAL INSTRANSIGENT ON OIL QUESTION  
AND PARTICULARLY HARD ON HOLLAND. END SUMMARY.

2. IN CONVERSATION DECEMBER 3 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER  
BENHIMA I TOLD HIM WE WERE VERY KEEN ON LEARNING ABOUT  
RESULTS OF ALGIERS CONFERENCE AND I WAS CERTAIN USG  
WOULD LIKE HEAR KING'S VIEWS AS WELL AS HIS OWN. BEN-  
HIMA REPLIED THAT HE WAS CERTAIN KING WOULD SEE ME  
SOON (APPOINTMENT NOW SET FOR AFTERNOON DECEMBER 5),  
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AND HE THEN GAVE ME THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT.

3. CONFEREES HAD DISCUSSED MILITARY SITUATION, CLASSIFICATION OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES IN TERMS ELIGIBILITY FOR OIL EXPORTS, ATTITUDE TOWARDS RUSSIA, AND ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION. CONFEREES DID NOT HAVE LONG DISCUSSION ON MILITARY EVENTS BECAUSE MOROCCAN DELEGATION HAD SAID THIS WAS MATTER FOR GENERAL STAFFS, NOT FOR POLITICIANS TO DECIDE; EGYPTIANS HAD GONE TO WAR ON OCTOBER 6 WITHOUT CONSULTING OTHER COUNTRIES, BUT OTHERS WERE SUPPORTING THEM LOYALLY AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. NEVERTHELESS, SUMMIT MEETING SHOULD NOT BE USED FOR DISCUSSION THAT SUPPORT UNLESS THERE CONCRETE INFORMATION FROM ARAB COMMANDERS INDICATING SOME NEW COMMITMENT NEEDED.

4. BENHIMA EMPHASIZED THAT ONE OF MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS WAS ISRAELI UNWILLINGNESS HONOR AGREEMENTS. HE SAID SADAT COULD HOPE TO HAVE HIS WAY TO ALGIERS ONLY BECAUSE TWO SUPER POWERS, US AND USSR, HAD GUARANTEED ISRAELI COMPLIANCE WITH CESAE FIRE AGREEMENT, BUT FACT NEITHER US NOR SOVIETS ABLE THUS FAR COMPEL ISRAEL TO OBSERVE AGREEMENT REGARDING WITHDRAWAL WAS OMINOUS. CREDIBILITY OF US AND OF SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD BEEN WEAKENED BY LACK OF PROGRESS THIS ISSUE, AND SO HAD SADAT'S.

5. ON QUESTION PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION, A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WERE QUICK TO ABANDON HUSSEIN. ALGERIA AND TUNISIA DID SO IN INSULTING TERMS. MOROCCO HAD SPOKEN IN FAVOR OF KING HUSSEIN'S POINT OF VIEW, DEFENDING HIS PROPOSAL FOR A REFERENDUM IN THAT PART OF PALESTINE NOW OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL. MOROCCO HAD URGED SUPPORT FOR THOSE CHIEFS OF STATE WHO FELT THEY COULD GET JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS TOGETHER AGAIN, BUT THERE HAD BEEN A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO. MOROCCAN EFFORTS FURTHERMORE HAMPERED BY BLATANT PARTIALITY OF ALGERIAN CHAIRMAN, WHO CONSTANTLY RULED AGAINST JORDANIAN. FAISAL ALSO SUPPORTED MOROCCAN POINT OF VIEW AND S  
, TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT, DID EGYPT AND SYRIA, WHO WERE MORE  
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UNDERSTANDING OF THE JORDANIAN PROBLEM THAN WERE SOME OTHERS.

5. ON OIL, FAISAL WAS ABSOLUTLEY INTRANSIGENT. HE SAID HE HAD GONE DOWN TO THE WIRE SUPPORTING AMERICANS AND HAD BEEN ACCUSED AND ISOLATED BY OTHER ARABS, WHO HAD SAID HE WAS AN AMERICAN AGENT. BUT AMERICANS HAD NOT COME THROUGH, AND HE NOW OBLIGED TO DO ALL HE COULD

TO SEE TO IT THAT HIS POINT OF VIEW ON PALESTINE PREVAILED. HOWEVER, BENHIMA SAID THAT BESIDES MOROCCO, MANY OTHERS WERE MORE UNDERSTANDING OF AMERICAN DILEMMA AND URGED A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH. AMONG THEM WERE KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, TUNISIA, EGYPT AND SUDAN.

6. BENHIMA SAID HE HAD PLEADED FOR A MORE BENIGN ATTITUDE REGARDING HOLLAND BY FAISAL BUT FAISAL WAS PARTICULARLY HARD ON HOLLAND HE, BENHIMA, THINKS THAT HOLLAND WILL BE DEPRIVED OF OIL LONGER THAN ANYONE ELSE. MOROCCO AND ABU DHABI ALSO INTERCEDED FOR JAPAN TO GET THEM SAME STATUS AS FRANCE AND ENGLAND AND IS OPTIMISTIC THAT THIS WILL BE POSSIBLE.

7. THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF CRITICISM OF QADHAFI, ESPECIALLY HIS PARIS PRESS CONFERENCE, AND A REALIZATION THAT THE USSR IS ALSO OPEN TO CRITICISM. TWO OR THREE ARAB MINISTERS WILL SHORTLY GO TO MOSCOW TO MAKE THAT POINT OF VIEW FELT.

8. EVERYBODY APPRECIATED IMPROVEMENT IN US-ARAB RELATIONS, BUT FEAR WAS THAT IF THE US CANNOT GET ISRAEL TO MOVE ON THE FIRST POINT OF THE SIX-POINT AGREEMENT, HOW CAN ANYTHING ELSE BE ACHIEVED UNDER US AEGIS LATER AT GENEVA? US ABILITY TO BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN ISRAELI ATTITUDE ON THE SIX POINTS IS TOUCHSTONE OF THE FUTURE. THE QUESTION WAS RAISED TIME AND AGAIN, IS ISRAEL IMPOSING ITS WILL ON THE US?

9. FONMIN SIAD THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VISIT TO CAIRO ON DECEMBER 13 HAS JUST BEEN ANNOUNCED AND THAT WAS GOOD BUT THAT THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ISRAELIS UNDER AMERICAN AUSPICES IS THE CHIEF ITEM.

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